The first three
parts :
- Evaluation and Vision of the Future
- Proposals and Projects
- Report on the Participatory Process Used
for the Evaluation and Future of the Alliance
- The second
stage of the Alliance :
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THE SECOND STAGE OF THE ALLIANCE
By Pierre Calame pic@fph.fr
First Contribution to a Collective Thinking Process
A/ First Stage of the Alliance: an Attempt to
Put Things in Perspective
2. Structuring the Alliance (1998-1999)
During this second period, the Alliance was structured
in two aspects: through the adoption and the development of communication
tools; and through a collective organization and governance of the
Alliance.
The adoption of common communication tools, i.e.
the means both for Allies to carry on discussions and facilitate
their collective work and for the Alliance to be given public viewing,
had been a concern since the beginning, supported by a newsletter.
As of 1998, however, the abundance of the material produced and
the diversity of systems in use made it necessary to upscale. For
this, the Alliance benefited from the development of the Internet,
which soon became indispensable, given its international nature
and the new possibilities, therefore the new momentum, it offered
for the structuring of a Òworld civil society.Ó The FPH financed
the release and operational costs of a new magazine in three languages,
Caravan. It also contributed to setting up and structuring an Alliance
Web site and began to finance the development of tools and methods
for remote communication, in connection with the Web site: a Directory
of Allies, a research data base, and the first Internet e-forums.
All of this, which was indispensable for the AllianceÕs
continuity, also produced growing operational costs.
The collective organization of the Alliance occupied,
during that period, a relatively small number of AlliesÑprobably
less than 200, and at some moments as few as thirty. But those were
the most active, most committed Allies. This led them naturally
to raising, more explicitly than the others, the question of the
AllianceÕs collective orientation. This question proved to be especially
difficult, or even contradictory, for a series of reasons mainly
due to the originality of the Alliance:
- Turning the Alliance into an institution, with executive bodies
and rules, carried the danger of changing is very nature, closing
it up, reducing its pluralism, and, in the process, making it
more commonplace and less useful.
- Formalizing the functions that would have to be filled showed
that the institutionalization of each of these would be complex
and expensive in terms of time and money.
- The strength of the Alliance, thus far, had resided in the
continuity of the process, which was guaranteed by the method
and the timetable. The FPH had proposed them and the Allies
had become associated with the Alliance on these bases. There
was the danger of having this continuity contested by the executive
bodies of the institution that would be set up.
- The FPH, in the hypothesis of the institutionalization of
the Alliance, would keep, at least for some time, Òthe power
of money.Ó In 1996, on request of the early Allies, the FPH
clarified the role that it was prepared to play in the Alliance:
it committed itself to backing the Alliance up to and including
the World Assembly (then planned for 1999-2000); it would finance
as a priority Òwhat was most difficult,Ó i.e.: the development
of new socioprofessional networks, reaching out to spheres that
were very different from those that constituted the Alliance
as a majority so far; and the organization of the World Assembly.
What would have happened if the priorities of the FPH and those
that might be set by the new legal bodies of the Alliance diverged?
We did not know how to overcome these contradictions.
The long debates in 1998 wore out some of the Allies, who then found
in the Alliance the usual tensions of the world of nonprofit organizations
and unions, which they thought had been avoided in the Alliance.
The outcome of those debates resulted in fact in a tenuous solution:
the Alliance would not be institutionalized and would therefore
have no formal members nor executive bodies; nevertheless, the Allies
designated, by voting for candidates that most of them did not know,
an International Facilitation Team (IFT), made up partly, moreover,
of FPH employees.
As soon as the IFT began to advance priorities
that differed from those of the FPH, a dead end was ahead. The visibility
of the perspectives darkened and suspicion set in. These tensions
and contradictions did not stop the work of the Alliance from progressing,
the proposals from being developed, and the methods from becoming
clearer.
During this period, the international context also
changed. Isolated at the time of its birth in its project of progressively
structuring a world civil society, the Alliance was soon caught
up with and quickly left behindÑat least in terms of numbers and
visibilityÑby more traditional nonprofit movements, such as ATTAC,
the lightning success of which revealed the aspiration, ten years
after the fall of the Berlin wall, to a collective resistance against
the rapid unhindered spread of Òneoliberal globalization.Ó
Many other pre-existing movements felt the need
for new forms of coordination to make this resistance more effective.
In addition, the success of the citizensÕ campaign against the more-or-less
secret negotiation of the MAI (Multilateral Agreement on Investment),
the success of international boycott actions, and the considerable
media impact of the demonstrations against the WTO in Seattle showed
that the development of the Internet had changed the political and
social hand and had enabled global actions spurred by the short-lived
coordination of social movements and NGOs. The appearance and success
of the first World Social Forum in Porto Alegre in January 2003
would be the concrete expression of these hopes.
These new structures and forms of action brought
the Alliance to redefine its position within the whole of the construction
dynamics of a world civil society. On the one hand, the visibility
and activism of the latter made these considerably appealing to
many Allies. On the other hand, those movements made it possible
to clarify the position of the Alliance, torn, at that point, between
the AlliesÕ contradictory aspirations. The Alliance, a pluralistic
proposal-building process, was in a complementary, not a competitive
position with regard to these other dynamics.
Affirmation of this specificity led to underscoring
the AllianceÕs specific characteristics: long-term continuity, insistence
on the methods; the determination to draw up solid proposals, the
search for dialogue; the determination to reflect the diversity
of the whole world.
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